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FINDING ROOM FOR INDEPENDENT CANDIDATES IN LIGHT
OF Arkansas Educational Television Commission v.
Forbes
Jennifer Wright-Brown
There is no sanctuary in the First Amendment for un-
limited private censorship operating in a medium not
-open to all.I
Public access to channels of political discourse
is vital to democratic ideals. 2 The Framers of our
Constitution held political speech above all other
discourse. 3 Thus, political speech deserves the ut-
most protection under the First Amendment.
4
When the government attempts to restrict polit-
ical speech in places traditionally "devoted to as-
sembly and debate," a plethora of Supreme Court
I See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367,
392 (1969) (discussing spectrum scarcity as a problem
unique to broadcasting). Red Lion scarcity rational prevents
broadcasters from congesting the air waves with their own
bias on matters of public importance or endorsing candi-
dates with whom they politically agree. See Red Lion, 395 U.S.
at 390, 392. Rather, broadcasters must represent the commu-
nities' views indiscriminately or their license will be revoked.
See id. at 389-90. But cf., Christopher S. Lentz, The Fairness in
Broadcasting Doctrine and the Constitution: Forced One-Stop Shop-
ping in the Marketplace of Ideas, 1996 U. ILL. L. REv. 271 (1996)
(questioning the rationale's viability in today's marketplace).
2 See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964)
(emphasizing that "speech concerning public affairs . . . is
the essence of self-government"). See generally Robert H.
Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47
IND. L.J. 1, 20-35 (1971) (discussing the emphasis placed on
protecting political speech).
3 The Framers envisioned a government where the free
exchange of political ideas would keep it free from faction,
or majority tyranny. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James
Madison) (Buccaneer Books, Inc., 1992). Madison valued
exchange of political thought because it laid at the core of
representative government. See generally CAss R. SUNSTEIN, A
REPUBLIC OF REASONS, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION (1993)
(discussing a "deliberative democracy," an ideal which re-
flects the Framer's desire to limit self-interested representa-
tion and promote majority rule).
4 See U.S. CONST. amend. I (providing "Congress shall
make no law... abridging the freedom of speech..."). The
Framers adopted the First Amendment to promote political
discourse. See Whitley v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927)
(Brandeis, J., concurring) (arguing "[those who won our in-
dependence] believed that freedom to think as you will and
to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discov-
ery and spread of political truth . . . ").
opinions have subjected the prohibitions to the
strictest of scrutiny.5 Candidate debate lies at the
core of this protection because it provides a me-
dium where spontaneous discussion can educate
the electorate about its candidates' platform.6
Historically, the media has effectively conveyed
political thought and stimulated public debate. 7
Today, Americans rely on electronic media as
their primary source of political information."
Televised debates have a substantial impact on
5 See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators'
Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (explaining that the burden is
on the State to show a "compelling state interest and that it is
narrowly drawn to achieve that end"). Alternatively, the state
may place a restriction on the "time, place and manner of
expression" on the condition that the restriction is "narrowly
tailored to serve a significant government interest," and it
"leaves open ample alternative channels of communication."
Id. See also United States Postal Serv. Comm'n v. Council of
Greenburgh, 453 U.S. 114, 131-32 (1981) (upholding the a
federal statute that prohibited unstamped mail from mail-
boxes when the restriction did not eliminate communica-
tion); Consol. Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.
530, 535-36 (1980) (striking down a restriction on literature
that debated controversial issues when the content-based re-
striction precluded free expression).
6 See MARION R. JUST, ET AL., CROSSTALK: CITIZENS, CANDI-
DATES AND THE MEDIA IN A PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN 65 (1996)
(comparing candidate debate to alternative campaign meth-
ods). Just contends that, unlike speeches or advertisements,
debates are valuable because their subject matter is not al-
ways within the candidates' control. See id.
7 Although critics have questioned the media's choices in
its issue coverage, even its earliest, skeptics recognized the
value in freedom of the press. Compare, Jefferson letter to
John Tyler (June 28, 1804), THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 152-53 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., Thomas
Jefferson Memorial Foundation, Inc., 1993) (finding that
free press is the most "effectual" . avenu[e] to truth"),
with MICHAELJ. ROBINSON ET AL., OVER THE WIRE AND ON TV
141-3 (1980) (discussing Jefferson's distaste of newspaper as
a primary source of political information).
8 See HERBERT B. ASHER, PRESIDENTIAL ELECrIONS AMERI-
CAN POLITICS: VOTERS, CANDIDATES, AND CAMPAIGNS SINCE
1952 240-244 (1992) [hereinafter ASHER, Presidential Elections]
(discussing "the patterns of media coverage over time"). Pro-
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candidate selection. 9 Critics argue that the me-
dia's control over political campaign coverage
and the high price of broadcast advertising ex-
cludes viable candidates.10
The Supreme Court has specifically recognized
the public's interest in choosing among legally
qualified candidates11 and has upheld legislation
granting all legally qualified candidates for fed-
eral office' 2 "reasonable access" to electronic me-
dia." ' However, candidates do not have a private
cause of action to enforce their statutory rights
and courts will only address the merits of a candi-
date's statutory complaint once the candidate has
exhausted his or her administrative remedies.14
At the start of its October 1997 Term, the
Supreme Court faced the question whether le-
gally-qualified candidates for federal office enjoy
a presumptive right of access to public broadcast-
fessor Asher discovered that by 1988, ninety-five percent of
the electorate relied on television for some campaign infor-
mation. See id. at 240; see also Reed E. Hundt, The Public's
Airwaves: What Does the Public Interest Require of Television Broad-
casters?, 45 DuKE L.J. 1089, 1102 (1996) (citingJeffery A. Levi-
son, Note, An Informed Electorate: Requiring Broadcasters to Pro-
vide Free Airtime to Candidates for Public Office, 72 B.U. L. Rev.
143, 146 n.10 (1992)). A 1992 survey conducted by the Los
Angeles Times indicated that 41% of Americans surveyed re-
ceived all their campaign information from television and
80% indicated they received most of their information from
television coverage. See id.
9 See, e.g., Just, supra note 6, at 71. During the 1992 de-
bates between President Bush and Bill Clinton, Clinton's em-
phasis on domestic economic affairs as opposed to foreign
policy contributed to his successful campaign. See id at 68-71.
10 See Montague Kern, Campaign '96: Messages for the New
Millenium, 8/1/97 Am. BEHAVORIAL SCIENTIST 1238, 8 (1997)
(discussing the "social cost" of campaign advertising and al-
ternative modes of electoral communication for poorly-
funded candidates). Kern suggests that the Internet may
provide candidates a cost effective alternative to communi-
cate. See id. at 9. However, the Internet cannot currently
provide a substitute for the valuable discourse exchanged
during a live debate. See, e.g., California and the West; Davis
Lungren Seek to Define Dfferences, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 24 1998, at.
A3 (summarizing a live debate between Gubernatorial candi-
dates who had the opportunity to ask questions of their op-
ponent).
11 The Court will look to state law to determine whether
a candidate is legally qualified for federal office. See In re
Complaint of Continuing Committee for Mayor Bergin v. Sta-
tion WATR-TV, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 90 F.C.C.2d
813, para. 3 (1982).
12 Congress purposely excluded state and local candi-
dates from the provisions of the Communications Act of 1934
§ 312(a) (7), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (1994), be-
cause the burden on the broadcasting industry would be se-
vere. See CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 378-79 (1981); see
also In re Codification of Commission's Political Program-
ming Policies, Report and Order, 7 FCC Rcd. 678, paras. 11-12
(1991), modified, 7 FCC Rcd. 4611 (1992).
ing stations that sponsor televised debate. 15 In Ar-
kansas Educational Television Commission v. Forbes,1 6
a state-owned broadcasting company sponsored a
debate between candidates running for federal
public office.' 7 Historically, candidates have en-
joyed a presumptive right of access to government
property commonly associated with "assembly and
debate," such as a public park or a private prop-
erty dedicated to public use.' Candidates may re-
fute their opponents' positions in these "tradi-
tional public forums" unless the government has a
compelling reason to deny the speaker's access' 9
Likewise, when the government regulates the me-
dia's access to a limited frequency-spectrum, it
may not censor broadcasters' viewpoints because "
. . . the editorial function itself is an aspect of
'speech.' "20 Public broadcasters, however, are
unique, because, as government employees, their
3 See CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 397 (1981) (up-
holding section 312(a)(7) of the Communications Act of
1934). Chief Justice Burger stated "it is of particular impor-
tance that candidates ... have the opportunity to make their
views known so that the electorate may intelligently evaluate
the candidates' personal qualities and their position on vital
public issues before choosing among them on election day."
See id. at 396 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 52-53
(1975)).
14 See, e.g., Perot v. FEC, 97 F.3d 553, 557-58 (D.C. Cir.
1996) (rejecting candidate Ross Perot's civil claim under the
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 ("FECA")
§ 309(a) (8) (C), as amended, 2 U.S.C. 43 7g(a) (8) (C) (1994),
because he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with
the FEC, which has primary jurisdiction to adjudicate any
claims brought under FECA).
15 See Forbes v. Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n, 22
F.3d 1423, 1426 (8th Cir. 1994), enforced, 93 F.3d 497 (8th
Cir. 1996), rev'd, 118 S. Ct. 1633 (1998).
16 See Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 118
S. Ct. 1633 (1998).
17 See id. at 1637.
18 See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Educators' Ass'n, 460
U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (discussing the public's First Amendment
right of access to the "traditional public forum").
19 See id. See, e.g., United States Postal Serv. Comm'n v. Coun-
cil of Greenburgh, 453 U.S. 114, 128, 132 (1981) (reasoning the
government may restrict unstamped mail from mailboxes
when mailboxes are "[essential] ... to the "delivery and re-
ceipt of mail"); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 840 (1975) (a
military commander may prohibit political speeches and dis-
tribution of literature on military grounds when he or she
concludes they are a "clear danger to military disloyalty").
20 See Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc., v.
FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 737 (1996) (citing Turner Broad. Sys.,
Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994)). Commonly, First Amend-
ment challenges, in cases involving the electronic media,
question the state's restriction on broadcasters' free expres-
sion, rather than the state's protection of broadcasters' edito-
rial discretion. See id. (discussing prominent First Amend-
ment broadcasting cases).
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decisions are subject to scrutiny under the First
Amendment.2' Thus, public networks must con-
sider the public's interest in free expression on
government property in order to ensure that no
person is excluded arbitrarily. 22
Ralph P. Forbes, an independent candidate 23
for Arkansas' Third Congressional District, as-
serted his First Amendment right to participate in
Arkansas Educational Television Network's, here-
inafter ("AETN"), debate because the station was
a government property dedicated to political
speech.2 4 Forbes brought a private action, 25 seek-
ing injunctive and declaratory relief, against the
Arkansas Educational Television Commission, 26
hereinafter ("AETC"), after AETC refused to al-
low Forbes to participate.2 7 The District Court for
21 A government-controlled entity is a state actor and
subject to the First Amendment, applicable to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV. See also Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 513
U.S. 374, 400 (1995) (recognizing that when the government
establishes a corporation and appoints its directors "the cor-
poration is part of the government for purposes of the First
Amendment"). Arkansas Educational Television Commis-
sion is a public television station established by the state of
Arkansas. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 6-3-102(a) (1) (b) (1)
(Michie Supp. 1997), § 25-16-804(b)(1) (Michie 1996).
Nonetheless, government-controlled networks, like commer-
cial networks enjoy the freedom to make programming deci-
sions without undue government restriction. See 47 U.S.C.
§§ 398(c), 399 (1994). See, e.g., In re Codification of Commis-
sion's Political Programming Policies, Report and Order, 7
F.C.C. Rcd 678, para. 9 (1991), modified, 7 F.C.C. Rcd. 4611
(1992) (holding both commercial and non-commercial sta-
tions subject to the same "reasonable access" provisions of
§ 312(a) (7) of the Communications Act of 1934).
22 See Arkansas Educ. Television Comm 'n, 118 S. Ct. at 1647-
8 (StevensJ, dissenting, joined by Souter and GinsburgJJ.)
(citing Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150-151
(1969)) (arguing that public broadcasters' decisions must be
based on objective criteria because, as state actors, they are
subject to the First Amendment). See also C. Thomas Dienes,
On Speech Issues, Court Speaks in Many Tongues, LEGAL TIMES,
JuLy 13, 1998 at S34 [hereinafter Dienes, On Speech Issues]
(discussing Justice Steven's dissent and concluding that pub-
lic networks must remain viewpoint neutral).
23 See ARK. CODE ANN. §7-7-103(c) (1) (1993). Forbes ob-
tained the 2,000 signatures required to qualify for the ballot.
See Brief for the Petitioner at 3, Arkansas Educ. Television
Comm'n v. Forbes, 118 S. Ct. 1633 (1998) (No. 96-779).
24 See Forbes v. Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n, 22
F.3d 1423, 1426 (8th Cir. 1994). But cf, Perot v. FEC, 97 F.3d
553, 557 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (affirming the district court's dis-
missal of candidate Ross Perot's First Amendment claim
when the debate's sponsor was a private network).
25 Forbes argued that, in the alternative, he had a statu-
tory right to additional airtime on AETN, under the Commu-
nications Act of 1934 § 315(a), as amended, 47 U.S.C.
§ 315(a) (1994). See Forbes, 22 F.3d at 1426. Section 315(a)
provides that "[i]f any licensee shall permit any person who is
the Western District of Arkansas granted a dismis-
sal for failure to state a claim.28 On appeal, the
Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded the district
court's dismissal of Forbes' First Amendment
claim. 29 The Eighth Circuit held that the AETN
must provide the court with "any principled rea-
son" for excluding Forbes from its debate. 0 On
remand, the district court held, as a matter of law,
that the AETN had sponsored the debate in a
nonpublic forum and the jury found that the net-
work had permissibly excluded Forbes for reasons
other than his political viewpoint. 31 Forbes again
appealed and the Eighth Circuit reversed. 32 The
Eighth Circuit held that when the state-owned
public television station sponsored a debate, it
designated its property a "limited public forum."33
a legally qualified candidate for any public office to use a
broadcasting station, he shall afford equal opportunities to
all other such candidates for that office ... ".47 U.S.C.
§ 315(a).
26 The Commission is a state agency in control of five
television stations comprising Arkansas Educational Televi-
sion Network. See Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes,
118 S. Ct. 1633, 1637 (1998). Eight staff members are ap-
pointed by Arkansas' governor and removed only for "good
cause." See id.
27 Susan Howarth, AETC's Executive Director denied
Forbes' request because AETC felt that Forbes was not a via-
ble candidate and AETC would effectively serve the public
interest by limiting the debate to the major party candidates.
See Brief for the Petitioner at 3, Arkansas Educ. Television
Comm'n v. Forbes, 118 S. Ct. 1633 (1998) (No. 96-779).
28 See Forbes v. Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n, 22
F.3d 1423, 1426 (8th Cir.1994). The district court rejected
Forbes' First Amendment claim based on DeYoung v. Patten,
898 F.2d 628 (8th Cir. 1990). Id. In DeYoung, the Eighth Cir-
cuit declined to extend to political candidates a First Amend-
ment right of access to the electronic media. See DeYoung,
898 F.2d at 632. The court dismissed Forbes' claim under
Section 315 because Forbes did not exhaust his administra-
tive remedies. See Forbes, 22 F.3d at 1428. The Eighth Circuit
noted that Forbes did contact the FCC but failed to file a
complaint. See id. at 1425-26.
29 See id. at 1430 (overruling in part the portion of De-
Young, 898 F.2d at 632, holding "[a] political candidate does
not hav a constitutional right of broadcast access to air his
views").
30 See id. On remand, the AETN contended that Forbes
was not "politically viable" and thus, it chose to limit its invita-
tion to candidates that the network felt had a chance to take
the seat. See Forbes v. Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n, 93
F.3d 497, 504 (8th Cir. 1996) (discussing the AETN'sjustifi-
cation for Forbes' exclusion).
31 See Forbes, 93 F.3d at 499-501 (8th Cir. 1996). The jury
concluded that the network's decision to exclude Forbes was
not influenced by political pressure or distaste for Forbes'
opinions. See id. at 501.
32 See id. at 505, rev'd, 118 S. Ct. 1633 (8th Cir. 1998).
33 See id. at 504.
1999]
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The Eighth Circuit reasoned that it opened its
network to a specific class of speakers - legally
qualified candidates running for the Third Dis-
trict Congressional seat - and for the specific
purpose of sponsoring a live debate. '34 Thus,
Forbes, as legally qualified candidate running for
this seat, had a presumptive right of access to a
limited public forum under the First Amend-
ment.
35
AETC petitioned the Supreme Court for re-
view. 3 6 AETC alleged that the Eighth Circuit
erred when it classified the debate as a designated
public forum37 because the AETC had reasonably
limited its invitation to viable candidates, 38 rather
than the general public. The network asserted its
decision to exclude Forbes from a nonpublic fo-
rum was reasonable in light of his lack of public
support.39 In the alternative, AETC argued that it
had a compelling state interest to serve the public
and that Forbes' exclusion was narrowly drawn to
achieve that end, given the debate's time con-
straints. 40 The Supreme Court granted certiorari
to resolve the conflict between the Eighth and
Eleventh Circuits concerning the issue of whether
forum analysis should apply to a government-
sponsored debate. 41
34 See id.
35 See Forbes v. Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n, 22 F.3d
1423, 1429 (8th Cir. 1994); 93 F.3d 497, 504-05 (8th Cir.
1996) (finding AETN's reason for Forbes' exclusion-his
political viability - neither compelling nor narrowly tailored
so as to survive a First Amendment challenge).
36 See Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n, 118 S. Ct 1633,
1638 (1998).
37 See Brief for Petitioner at 18, Arkansas Educ. Televi-
sion Comm'n v. Forbes, 118 S. Ct 1633 (1998) (No. 96-779).
38 AETN staff deemed a candidate "viable" when he or
she elicited media coverage and financial support. Id. at 16-
17.
39 See id. However, Forbes was a viable candidate in the
election for Lieutenant Governor in 1990 when Forbes re-
ceived 46% of the vote in a three-candidate race. See Arkansas
Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 118 S. Ct 1633, 1645 (1998)
(Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Souter and Ginsburg, JJ.).
Furthermore, Forbes carried the majority in 15 out of 16
counties within the Third Congressional District. See id.
40 See Brief for Petitioner at 18, Arkansas Educ. Televi-
sion Comm'n v. Forbes, 118 S. Ct 1633 (1998) (No. 96-779).
41 See Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n, 118 S. Ct at 1638.
In Chandler v. Georgia Public Telecommunications Commission,
the Eleventh Circuit denied that forum analysis applied to
government sponsored debates. 917 F.2d 486, 488 (11th Cir.
1990). The opinion analogized the debate to a news pro-
gram where the station maintains control over the program's
content. Cf Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n, 118 S.Ct at
1640 (explicitly rejecting the Eleventh Circuit's reasoning).
The majority found that broadcasters exercise little control
over the content of the candidates' speech. See id. Thus,
The Court held, six-to-three, that legally quali-
fied candidates have no presumptive right of ac-
cess when state-owned broadcasting companies
sponsor political debates. 42 The majority held
that government-sponsored debate embodies a
nonpublic forum, for purposes of the First
Amendment.4 3 As a result, AETC could exclude
Forbes so long as his exclusion was "viewpoint
neutral" and "reasonable in light of the purpose
of the property. 4
4
Justices Stevens, Souter and Ginsburg, dissent-
ing, questioned the neutrality in AETC's "ad hoc"
candidate selection process. 45 Justice Stevens,
writing for the dissent, reasoned that when AETC
dedicated its property to political debate between
viable candidates, it had, in fact, issued a permit
to participating candidates. 4 6 The dissent con-
tended that this permit was analogous to a prior
restraint on speech.4 7 The dissent argued that
when the government places a prior restraint on
speech, it must base its selection process on "ob-
jective criteria."4 8 Despite AETC's attempt to jus-
tify its candidate selection process,49 the dissent
refused to accept its decision as anything more
than arbitrary. 50
This Note examines the special nature of gov-
debate is subject to forum analysis. See id. at 1640-41.
42 See id. at 1637.
43 See id. at 1642.
44 See id. at 1643. The opinion emphasized that a state
may restrict public access to a nonpublic forum when its ex-
clusion of a class of persons is "reasonable" and in accord
with the "governmental intend[ed]" purpose of the property.
See id at 1642-43. See also Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Edu-
cators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 49 (1983) (holding that limited
access to a nonpublic forum is permissible when the exclu-
sion is based on "status" rather than viewpoint). The major-
ity compared the facts in Perry to the case at bar and con-
cluded that AETC excluded Forbes' based on his unpopular
status rather than his political views. See id.
45 Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n, 118 S. Ct. at 1645
(Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Souter and Ginsburg, JJ.)
(arguing that AETC had "no secure basis for exercise of gov-
ernmental power consistent with the First Amendment").
46 See id. at 1647-48.
47 See id.
48 See id. at 1648 (citing Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham,
394 U.S. 147, 150-51 (1969)). In Shuttlesworth, the Court in-
validated a city ordinance permitting city officials to withhold
a permit for expressive activity based on their own arbitrary
notions of disruptions to the public "welfare, peace and
safety." See Shuttlesworth, 394 U.S. at 150-51.
49 See Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n, 118 S. Ct. at 1649.
See also THE ARKANSAS EDUCATIONAL TELEVISION COMMISSION
PROGRAMMING POLICY FOR AETN 2 (adopted June 7, 1994)
(describing AETC's commitment to serving the public inter-
est).
50 See Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n, 118 S. Ct. at 1649.
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ernment sponsored campaign debates. First, this
Note discusses the Supreme Court's treatment of
political speech in light of the First Amendment
and distinguishes public broadcasters' First
Amendment rights from broadcasters in general.
Second, it compares candidates' First Amend-
ment interests in accessing the electronic media
to the electorate's interest in making educated
political choices. Then, this Note analyzes the
majority and dissenting opinions in Arkansas Edu-
cational Television Network v. Forbes. Finally, this
Note concludes that in order to preserve political
debate, the Court must define some neutral
guideline on which public broadcasters will base
their decisions. Absent objective criteria, the elec-
torate's interest will suffer because public broad-
casters may hesitate to schedule debates, or alter-
natively, exclude viable candidates from public
scrutiny.
I. POLITICAL SPEECH: MOVING FROM
THE STREETS TO THE AIRWAVES
A. The Public Forum: Government's Control
Over America's First Amendment Values
The Supreme Court introduced the Public Fo-
rum Doctrine in Hague v. Committee for Industrial
Organization.51 Prior to the Hague decision, the
government had exercised control over the free-
The dissent criticized the majority's deference to AETC staff
who are essentially "government officials" for purposes of the
First Amendment. The dissent argued that the law is well set-
fled-when government officials attach a prior restraint to
speech activity, this restraint must be set according to objec-
tive criteria. See id. at 1648 (citing Forsyth County v. Nation-
alist Movment, 505 U.S. 123 (1992).
51 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
52 See C. Thomas Dienes, The Trashing of the Public Forum:
Problems In First Amendment Analysis, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
109, 111 (1986) [hereinafter Dienes, Trashing the Forum Doc-
trine] (discussing the evolution of the public forum). Profes-
sor Dienes noted the Court's rejection of free expression on
all government property. See id at 114-115.
53 See Hague, 307 U.S at 515. Cf Whitney v. California,
274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (BrandeisJ., concurring) (analogis-
ing the Framer's intent in finding that freedom of speech is
absolute). Brandeis contended that the Framers "believed
that the final end of the state was to make men free to de-
velop their faculties .. . [W]ithout free speech and assembly
discussion would be futile." See id.
54 See Hague, 307 U.S at 512-13.
55 Cf cases cited supra note 5, with Hague, 307 U.S. at 515
(capturing the Framer's spirit of assembly, stating that
"[w] herever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have
immemorially been held in trust ... for purposes of assem-
bly, communicating thoughts between citizens and discussing
dom of expression on all public property.52 In
Hague, the Court re-embraced the value of assem-
bly and debate. 53 The Hague opinion prevented
city officials from impeding a labor organization's
efforts to express their views on the National La-
bor Relations Act.54 The Court held that the or-
ganization enjoyed a First Amendment right to
distribute pamphlets on the public streets. 55
However, the Hague Court determined that the
public's First Amendment freedoms were not ab-
solute. 56 The government therefore could regu-
late expressive activity on government property.57
In Perry Education Association v. Peny Local Educa-
tors' Association,58 the Supreme Court explained
the concept of the "public forum." 59 The Peny
Court divided government property into three
categories. 60 The first category was the traditional
public forum recognized in Hague,61 where the
government's interest in regulating speech activi-
ties must be compelling and its restriction nar-
rowly drawn.62 The second category is a desig-
nated public forum that the government opened
specifically to speech activity. 63 As long as the fo-
rum remains open, the state is bound by the same
standard as if the property was a traditional public
forum. 64 The third category is the nonpublic fo-
rum where the property at issue is not originally
intended for speech activity.65 Here, the state
may restrict speech so long as the restriction is
public questions").
56 See generally, Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some
First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 11 (1971) (discussing
the First Amendment's boundaries).
57 See e.g., United States v. Kokinda, 493 U.S. 807 (1989)
(upholding a federal law that prohibits solicitation on post
office grounds); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966)
(upholding University Students' trespass conviction after
they protesting on jailhouse grounds).
58 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
59 See id. at 45-47.
60 See id.
61 See id. at 45.
62 See id. (citing Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461
(1980)). Since Carey, the Court hesitated to extend the tradi-
tional public forum beyond streets and parks. See e.g., Inter-
national Soc. For Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505
U.S. 672, 680-81 (1992) (rejecting Petitioner's argument that
an airport terminal is analogous to a traditional public fo-
rum).
63 See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460
U.S. 37, 45 (1983). When the government chooses affirma-
tively to open its property to speech activity, the property be-
comes a designated public forum. See id.




"reasonable" in light of "the use to which it is law-
fully dedicated." 66  A restriction is reasonable
when it makes no attempt to suppress the
speaker's views.67
In Perry, a union, Perry Local Educators' Associ-
ation ("PLEA"), and two of its members brought
an action challenging a provision of a collective
bargaining agreement, giving one union, Perry
Education Association ("PEA"), exclusive access
to the schools' internal mail system. 68 PLEA ar-
gued the agreement curtailed communication be-
tween PLEA and its members and thus violated
their rights under the First Amendment.69 The
Court held that the internal mail system at issue
constituted a nonpublic forum, 70 because the
school board's selective access provision reason-
ably limited entry to PEA who "participated in the
forum's official business."7 1 The Perry Court em-
phasized that the government does not designate
a public forum when it provides selective access to
individual speakers. 72
The Supreme Court remained reluctant in Cor-
nelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund,
Inc.,7 3 to invalidate a government regulation on
speech activity in a nonpublic forum when the
Court found that the restriction did not suppress
the viewpoint of the speaker.74 In Cornelius, legal
66 See id. (quoting United States Postal Serv. v. Council of
Greenburgh Civic Ass'n, 453 U.S. 114, 129-30 (1981).
67 See id. (reasoning that that the First Amendment does
not "guarantee access" to all government chattels).
68 See id. at 40.
69 See Peny, 460 U.S. at. 40. Cf id. at 71 (Brennan, J.
joined by Marshall, Powell and Stevens, J.J., dissenting) (as-
serting that PLEA's exclusion from the internal mail system
was viewpoint based and violated the First Amendment).
70 The government may restrict access to its property not
designated for speech activity as long as the restriction is
"reasonable in light of the purpose that the forum serves."
See id. at 47. Selective access to a nonpublic forum is reason-
able when it is consistent with the states' "legitimate interest
in 'preserving the property ... for the use to which it is law-
fully dedicated."' See id. (citing United States Postal Serv. v.
Greenburgh Civic Ass'n, 453 U.S. 114, 129-30 (1981)).
71 See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n,
460 U.S. 37, 53 (1983).
72 See id. at 49 n.9 (citing Lehman v. Shaker Heights, 418
U.S. 298, 304 (1976)). Justice Blackmun feared that all "pub-
lic facilities would immediately become Hyde Parks open to
every would-be pamphleteer and politician"). See id. Nota-
bly, "pamphleteers and politicians" still gather at "Speakers
Corner" on Sunday afternoons in Hyde Park to stir up debate
from the passers-by.
73 473 U.S. 788 (1985).
74 The challengers carried a heavy burden because the
Court's "reasonableness standard" is fairly easy to meet. See
Dienes, Trashing the Forum Doctrine, supra note 52, at 117-18
defense and political advocacy groups challenged
an Executive Order 75 that excluded them from a
charity drive directed at federal employees and
military personnel. 76 The Court upheld the Exec-
utive Order, which explicitly prohibited the
groups' participation in the charity. 77 The major-
ity believed that the government intended to cre-
ate a nonpublic forum when it targeted the char-
ity to limit solicitation in the workplace,7 drawing
from its precedent which upheld regulations on
speech activity that were consistent the forum's
purpose.7 9 Nonetheless, the Court cautioned that
selective access to a nonpublic forum is constitu-
tionally permissible only when it is rationally re-
lated to a valid government interest and thus,
viewpoint neutral.8 0 Although the Cornelius Court
articulated the distinction between "general ac-
cess" to a designated public forum and "selective
access" to a nonpublic forum,8 ' it left the division
between "viewpoint based" and "viewpoint neu-
tral" for the challenger to define.8 2
In Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univer-
sity of Virginia,8 3 the Court in a plurality decision,
refused to tolerate viewpoint discrimination on
government property designated as a nonpublic
forum.8 4 In Rosenberger, a state university estab-
lished guidelines governing its distribution of
(discussing the various cases where the Court upheld the reg-
ulation of a nonpublic forum as reasonable and viewpoint
neutral).
75 See Exec. Order No. 12,353, as amended by No.
12,404, 5 C.F.R. 950.101 (1997) (limiting CFC participation
to "charitable fundraising programs").
76 See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 790, 796.
77 See id. at 812.
78 See id. at 804-06.
79 See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators'
Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983) (limiting outside correspondence
circulating through a School Board's internal mail system);
Lehman v. Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1976) (restricting
political advertising space on buses).
80 See Cornelius, 473 U.S at 811. See also Dienes, Trashing
the Forum Doctrine, supra note 52, at 117. Professor Dienes
suggests that the Cornelius Court minimized the govern-
ments' burden in justifying its exclusion of advocacy groups
from a nonpublic forum because other controversial groups,
such as Planned Parenthood and the Right to Life Educa-
tional Trust Fund participated in the charity drive. See id.
81 See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense Fund, Inc., 473 U.S.
788, 803, 805 (1985); Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v.
Forbes, 118 S. Ct. 1633, 1642 (1998) (discussing the Cornelius
Court's forum analysis).
82 See Dienes, Trashing the Forum Doctrine, supra note 52, at
118 (analogizing to the difficulty a challenger has proving
government intent in the context of Equal Protection cases).
83 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
84 See id. at 832, 837.
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funds toward student activities and excluded in-
dependent student groups who participated in
religious activity.85 In a five-to-four decision, the
Court invalidated the guidelines on the basis that
the University discriminated against the student
groups solely because of their viewpoint. 86 The
Court emphasized that all speech contributes to
the marketplace of ideas.8 7 Rosenberger confirmed
that the First Amendment prohibits all govern-
ment efforts to suppress the viewpoint of the
speaker, regardless of whether the forum is lim-
ited to selective speakers.88
B. The Public Broadcaster's Role as Public
Trustee
Congress adopted the Communications Act of
193489 in order to preserve broadcasters' First
Amendment right to "the widest journalistic free-
dom consistent with their public obligation."90
85 See id. at 825. The guidelines defined religious activity
as "activity that primarily promotes or manifests a particular
benefit in or about a deity or an ultimate reality." See id.
86 See id. at 831, 846 (rejecting the argument that the
guidelines were viewpoint neutral because they excluded all
religious speech).
87 See id. at 831-32.
88 See id. at 829, 837 (holding that the viewpoint-based
guidelines deprived private groups of their First Amendment
right to free expression).
89 47 U.S.C. §§ 307, 312, 315, 399 (1994).
90 See Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l
Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 110 (1973). In Columbia, the Court
stated it will defer to the FCC's judgment unless there are
.compelling indications of error." See id.
91 By 1960, the broadcast media had become the public's
primary source of information. See e.g., Asher, supra note 8,
at 240. Asher's 1988 survey indicated that 87% of the public
relied on television for campaign information, while 42% re-
lied on the radio. See id.
92 See Meridith C. Hightower, Beyond Lights and Wires in a
Box: Ensuring the existence of Public Television, 3 .J.L. & Pol'y
133, 175-76 n.51 (1994) (comparing Miami Herald Publ'g
Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (invalidating a Florida
statute that imposed an affirmative obligation on newspapers
to provide candidates with free reply space when the papers
condemned their actions), with Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC,
395 U.S. 367, 385 (1969) (upholding the FCC's efforts to im-
pose a "fairness doctrine" on the electronic media that would
essentially achieve the same end). Hightower suggests that
these cases are "mirror images" (quoting Fred W. Friendly,
THE GOOD GuYs, THE BAD Guys AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
XV 193 (1976)). But see, Columbia Broad. Sys. Inc., 412 U.S. at
110 (discussing the broad journalistic freedom enjoyed in
the broadcast industry). See alsoJeffery S. Hops, Red Lion in
Winter: First Amendment and Equal Protection Concerns in the Al-
location of Direct Broadcast Satellite Public Interest Channels, 6
CoMMLAw CONSPECTUS 185, 187 (1998) (discussing the ten-
sion between the Court's holdings in Tornillo and Red Lion).
93 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
After the broadcast industry became an influen-
tial actor in the field of communications,9 1 the
Supreme Court promptly distinguished broadcast-
ers' First Amendment rights from the media in
general.9 2 In Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,9 3
Justice White explained that broadcasters ex-
change a portion of their First Amendment rights
in return for control of a scarce number of media
outlets open to the public.9 4 Essentially, Red Lion
established the relationship between the govern-
ment, broadcasters and the public.95  In the
Court's view, broadcasters hold the public interest
in trust when they operate under a license issued
by the government. 96 As public trustees, broad-
casters are expected to exchange some of their
First Amendment rights for the good of society.9 7
Today, broadcasters' judgments are subject to
review only when the station fails to fairly serve
the public interest.98 However, the Court contin-
ues to rely on the scarcity rationale to prevent
94 See id. at 388-89. Red Lion unanimously upheld the
FCC's requirement that broadcaster's employ a "fairness doc-
trine" which allowed the public a reply time when stations
aired personal attacks or political editorials. Id. at 400-01.
Although the Fairness Doctrine still binds the industry to dis-
seminating a balance of information, its validity in today's
marketplace has been questioned. See Lentz supra note 1, at
283-85 (discussing the Commission's rejection of scarcity ra-
tional); see also In re Inquiry into Section 73.1920 of the Com-
mission's Rules and Regulations Concerning the General
Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broadcast Licensees, Report,
102 F.C.C.2d 145, paras. 104-24 (1985) (urging that spectrum
scarcity is no longer a legitimate concern because new
sources of communication disperse information). Congress
failed to generate enough support in all three of its attempts
to pass the Fairness in Broadcasting Act. See Lentz, supra
note 1, at 285-86.
95 The government conditions Broadcasters' licenses on
the premise that the "public interest, convenience, and ne-
cessity would be served." See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 394; 47
U.S.C. § 307(a) (1994).
96 See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390 (stating "the Government
is permitted to put restraints on licensees in favor of others
whose views should be expressed on this unique medium").
The FCC has the authority to issue licenses for up to eight
years. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104,
§ 203, 110 Stat. 112 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C.
307(c)(1)); see also FCC v. Sander Bros. Radio Station, 309
U.S. 470, 475 (1940) (recognizing that licenses are issued for
a limited time and subject to review by the Commission).
97 See Lentz, supra note 1, at 292; see also Hightower, supra
note 92, at 179-80 (discussing Red Lion and the Court's treat-
ment of the fairness doctrine).
98 Despite Red Lion's emphasis on the public's right to
receive balanced programming, the Court rejected the no-
tion that the general public has an unlimited right of access
to the airwaves. See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 391. Rather, the
public has a First Amendment right to a "balanced presenta-
tion of information on issues of public importance." See Co-
lumbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S.
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broadcasters' own bias from congesting the air
waves. 99
In FCC v. League of Women Voters,100 the Court
addressed whether public broadcasters should be
treated differently with respect to their First
Amendment rights. In League of Women Voters, the
Court held that Section 399 of the Public Broad-
casting Act 1°' impermissibly restricted public sta-
tions' freedom of speech.' 0 2 The Act prohibited
noncommercial stations that received funds from
the Corporation for Public Broadcasting
("CPB")' 0 3 from engaging in "editorializing" or
"support[ing] or oppos[ing]" political candi-
dates.10 4 Some station operators alleged that the
Act violated their First Amendment rights.' 0 5 The
Court agreed that Section 399 was directed at edi-
torial speech, which "lies at the heart of First
Amendment protection."'01 6 However, the Court
contended that Congress had the authority under
the Commerce Clause 10 7 to regulate scarce re-
sources.'08 The majority reasoned that spectrum
scarcity 09 supported the government's "impor-
94, 112 (1973). The FCC has the authority, under the Com-
munications Act of 1934, to determine whether the licensee
made a "good faith" effort to keep the public "fully and
fairly" informed. See Columbia, 412 U.S. at 127. However, the
Court refused to extend FCC's authority to encompass super-
vision that would unnecessarily intrude on the daily opera-
tions of the industry. See id. at 126-27.
99 See e.g., CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 395 (1981) (cit-
ing Red Lion, 395 U.S. 367, 389 (1969)).
100 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
101 See 47 U.S.C. § 399 (1994). Section 399 provided that
"[n]o noncommercial educational broadcasting station
which receives a grant from the Corporation for Public
Broadcasting under subpart C of this part may engage in
editoralizing. No noncommercial educational broadcasting
station may support or oppose any candidate for public of-
fice." See League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 370-71 & n. 7
(discussing the legislative history of Section 399).
102 See League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 398.
103 47 U.S.C. § 396-399B (1994). The primary purpose
for the corporation was to appropriate funds for alternative
programming which would promote the diversity inhibited
in commercial broadcasting because of its dependence on
outside support. See Hightower, supra note 92, at 138-49 (dis-
cussing the Carnegie Commssion's vision for public televi-
sion), See also Section 39 9 (g) (1) (A) providing that the Cor-
poration's grants will be distributed "with strict adherence to
objectivity and balance in all programs or series of programs
of a controversial nature." 47 U.S.C. § 396(g) (1) (A). Sec-
tion 396(a)(1)-(10) outlines the government interest in es-
tablishing the corporation. 47 U.S.C. §396 (a)(1)-(10)
(1994). See also League of Women Voters, 468 U.S at 367-70 (dis-
cussing the legislative history); Hightower, supra note 92, at
146-49 (discussing the Corporation's purpose).
104 See League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 367. The
League of Women Voters did not challenge the language
prohibiting noncommercial stations from "support[ing ] or
tant and substantial interest" to ensure that broad-
casters remain responsive to the public by provid-
ing it with a "balanced presentation of views." 110
The Court concluded that the issue was whether
Congress "narrowly tailored Section 399 to fur-
ther a substantial government interest."11' The
opinion stated that Section 399 did not meet this
standard.1 12 The Court was reluctant to sacrifice
the rights of noncommercial broadcasters when
the scope of Section 399 centered on the content
of editorial speech. 1 3 The majority reasoned that
editorial speech was "precisely that form of
speech which the Framers of the Bill of Rights
were most anxious to protect-speech that is in-
dispensable to the discovery and spread of polit-
ical truth."' 14 However the Court's holding did
not deny Congress or the FCC their power to reg-
ulate content-based speech.' 15 The Court de-
clined to subject the government to the "compel-
ling interest" standard that encompasses strict
scrutiny. 116 Although League of Women Voters at-
tempted to resolve the tension between broadcast-
oppos[ing[ candidates for public broadcasting and the Court
did not address this issue on appeal. See id. at 371 n. 9.
105 See id. at 370-71.
106 See League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 381.
107 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
108 See League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 376.
109 The majority recognized that the theory of spectrum
scarcity had been subject to criticism, however the Court de-
clined to rule on the theories' feasibility unless Congress or
FCC initiated some revision of current regulation, in light of
new technological advances. See id. at 376 n. 11.
110 See id. at 377.
11 See id. at 380 (explicitly rejecting the district court's
application of the compelling interest standard to evaluate
§ 399).
112 See id. at 381. The majority refused to create a 'sub-
stantial government interest' in a regulation "motivated by
nothing more than a desire to curtail expression of a particu-
lar point of view on controversial issues of general interest."
See id. at 383-84. See generally, 1988 Amendment. Pub. L. 100-
626 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 399) (substituting
"Support of" for "Editorializing and Support" and eliminated
the provisions prohibiting noncommercial broadcasters from
editorializing).
113 See League of Women Voters, 468 U.S at 382 (reasoning
that editorializing is "a means of satisfying the public's inter-
est in receiving a wide variety of ideas and views through the
medium of broadcasting has long been recognized by the
FCC"). Id. (discussing Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees,
13 F.C.C.2d 1246 (1949)). The Court noted that the Com-
mission's opinion applied equally to both noncommercial
and commercial stations until Section 399 specifically prohib-
ited noncommercial stations from editorializing. Id. at n. 14.
114 See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 383
(1984).
115 See id. at 402.
116 See id. at 381-82 (1984) (finding editorializing indis-
[Vol. 7
Finding Room for Independent Candidates
ers' interest in freedom of expression and the gov-
ernment's interest in remaining viewpoint
neutral, 117 it failed to emphasize the govern-
ment's involvement in noncommercial broad-
caster's programming decisions.' 18
C. CBS, Inc. v. FCC: A Candidate's Right to
Access
Candidates for public office do not have an un-
limited right of access to electronic media, rather
candidates have a "reasonable right."119 In CBS,
Inc. v. FCC,120 private networks petitioned the
Court for review of a FCC order 12 holding that
the networks violated section 312(a)(7).122 The
majority agreed that the networks had, in fact, vio-
lated the provision.' 2 3 The Court declined to
read the provision as a "general duty" to cover
some political programming when Congress
clearly required broadcasters to provide individ-
ual "legally qualified" federal candidates "reason-
pensable to political truth); id. at 381 (justifying a "substan-
tial interest" standard based on the government's role in
monitoring the electronic media that receives CPB funds).
The Court concluded that the public interest prevails in
either case. Compare League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 376-7
(finding that government can permissibly regulate the indus-
try), with League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 382 (reasoning
that editorializing serves the public interest).
117 See id. at 395-96.
118 Cf id. at 415-16 (1998) (Stevens, J. dissenting) (rea-
soning that Section 399 prevented the government from be-
coming entangled in political "propaganda"); id. at 408
(Rehnquist, J. dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J. and White,
J.) (contending that Congress made a rational decision when
it limited Corporation for Public Broadcasting funds to edu-
cational rather than editorial or political programming).
119 See discussion supra note 13 and accompanying text.
120 453 U.S. 367 (1981).
121 See In re Complaint of Carter-Mondale Presidential
Comm., Inc. against ABC, CBS and NBC Television Net-
works, 74 F.C.C.2d 631 (1979).
122 See CBS, Inc., 453 U.S. at 374. See generally 47 U.S.C.
§ 312 (a)(7); see also discussion on section 312(a) (7) supra
notes 11-13 and accompanying text. The Carter-Mondale
Presidential Committee filed a complaint with the FCC after
ABC, CBS, and NBC denied the committee's request to
purchase air time. See CBS, Inc., 453 U.S. at 374. The FCC
rejected the networks' excuses, calling them "deficient"
under its "standards of reasonableness" and ordered the net-
works to comply with 312(a)(7). See id. at 374 (citing In re
Complaint of Carter-Mondale Presidential Comm., Inc.
against ABC, CBS and NBC Television Networks, 74 F.C.C.2d
631 paras. 45, 46 (1979)).
123 See CBS, Inc., 453 U.S. at 395, 397.
124 See id. at 377-78. The Court reasoned that the severity
of the sanctioned imposed, license revocation, supported an
interpretation of the statute that enlarges broadcasters' obli-
gations to air political programming. See id. at 378.
able access" in order to promote "his candi-
dacy."' 24 The opinion confirmed that Section
312(a) (7) exceeded programming obligations im-
posed under Section 315.125 The Court con-
cluded that Section 312(a)(7) did not violate
broadcasters' First Amendment rights by hamper-
ing their discretion, rather Section 312(a) (7) pro-
moted First Amendment values by fostering polit-
ical speech. 126 Thus, in CBS, Inc., the Court
remained careful not to undermine broadcasters'
editorial judgments.127
D. FCC's Clarification of Broadcasters'
Obligations Under Section 312(a) (7)
In 1991, the FCC sought to clarify existing poli-
cies regulating political programming. 28  The
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 129 sought to for-
malize existing guidelines defining "reasonable
access" under Section 312(a) (7).130 The Commis-
125 See CBS, Inc., 453 U.S. at 377. The Court noted that
before the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, the FCC
only required that broadcasters allocate some broadcast time
to political speech, nor did candidates have any right of ac-
cess unless his or her opponent aired his or her views. -Id. at
387. See generally, 47 U.S.C. § 315 (providing "equal opportu-
nity" to all legally qualified candidates running for the same
public office). But see, CBS, Inc., 453 U.S. at 403-04 (WhiteJ.,
dissentingjoined by RehnquistJ., and StevensJ.) (finding lit-
tle support in the provision's legislative history for the major-
ity's conclusion).
126 See id. at 401 (persuading that "political broadcasting
is one of the fourteen elements necessary to meet the public
interest, needs and desires of the community") (citing In re
Commission Policy in Enforcing Section 312(a)(7) of the
Communications Act, Report and Order, 68 F.C.C.2d 1079, pa-
ras. 33-38 (1978)).
127 See id. at 395 (permitting 'Journalistic freedom consis-
tent with its public duties.") (citing Columbia Broad. Sys.,
Inc., v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 110 (1973)).
The Court will "afford great weight to the decisions of Con-
gress and the experience of the [FCC]" when it examines
First Amendment claims. See Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 412
U.S. at 102.
128 See In re Codification of the Commission's Political
Programming Policies, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 6 FCC
Rcd. 5707 (1991) [hereinafter Notice of Proposed Rulemaking].
The Preamble stated that a 1990 audit of 13 television and
radio stations indicated that candidates paid considerable
higher rates than commercial advertisers. See id. at para. 6.
129 See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 128.
130 See In re Codification of the Commission's Political
Programming Policies, 7 FCC Rcd. 678, para. 7 (1991) [here-
inafter Political Programming Policies]. Four comments ad-
dressed the Commission's proposal. Three comments sug-
gested "quantifiable access" or specific number of hours per
week and one suggested a formula that would account for
the markets' stations versus populations. See id. (citing Coin-
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sion declined to adopt formalized rules. '31
Rather, it continued to rely on "reasonable, good
faith judgments of licensees to provide reasonable
access to federal candidates."'132 The Commission
stated it would continue to evaluate claims under
Section 312(a)(7) on a case-by-case basis. 33
Thus, the FCC concluded that the guidelines out-
lined in the Commission's 1978 Report and Order
on Reasonable Access' 34 remained applicable. 135
The FCC reasoned that these guidelines were re-
affirmed pursuant to the Court's opinion in CBS,
Inc. 1 36 As a result, both commercial and noncom-
mercial educational stations must allot program-
ming time to legally qualified candidates unless
"unusual circumstances" make it reasonably diffi-
cult. ' 3 7
II. ARKANSAS EDUCATIONAL TELEVISION
COMMISSION V. FORBES: THE SEARCH
FOR POLITICAL TRUTH IN THE FORUM
OF PUBLIC BROADCAST
A. Public Broadcasters and Their First
Amendment Interests
In Arkansas Educational Television Commission v.
Forbes,'38 the Supreme Court denied independent
candidates a presumptive right of access under
ments of Greater Media, Inc., to the Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking supra note 128, at 3 (1991); Comments of Outlet
Broadcasting at 1 (1991)).
131 See Political Programming Policies, supra note 130, at
para. 8.
132 See id. (rejecting comments that suggested it apply
complex formulas).
133 See id. The Commission reviews both the candidate's
request and the station's response. Id.
134 See Political Programming Policies, supra note 130, at
para. 8.
135 See id. at para. 9. See generally In re Commission Policy
in Enforcing Section 312(a) (7) of the Communications Act,
Report and Order, 68 F.C.C.2d 1079 (1978) [hereinafter Policy
in Enforcing Section 312(a) (7)].
136 See CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 391-94 (1981) (ap-
plying the FCC's guidelines on enforcing Section 312(a) (7)
to evaluate a statutory complaint brought pursuant to the
provision). See e.g., Policy in Enforcing Section 312(a)(7),
supra note 135, para. 55 (outlining objective guidelines, gov-
erning both commercial and noncommercial broadcasters,
in their allocation of airtime to political candidates for fed-
eral office).
137 See Political Programming Policies, supra note 130,
para. 9.
138 See Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 118
S. Ct. 1633 (1998).
139 See id. at 1644.
the First Amendment to government operated tel-
evision networks.1 39 In 1992, a public broadcast-
ing network, Arkansas Educational Television Net-
work, 140 sponsored a debate between the major
party candidates running for Arkansas's Third
Congressional District.1 41 The Arkansas Educa-
tional Television Commission invited major party
candidates to participate but excluded Forbes, an
independent candidate, running for the same of-
fice. 142 Forbes protested, arguing that he had a
presumptive right of access to a state owned and
operated facility under the First Amendment. 43
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to deter-
mine whether access to the debate was indeed, a
First Amendment problem.144
Forbes contended that the Eighth Circuit cor-
rectly held that his exclusion was contrary to the
First Amendment because AETC intentionally
opened its station to qualified candidates, inviting
the exchange of political discourse, when it
planned and sponsored a congressional debate. 45
Forbes asserted that AETC failed to offer a com-
pelling reason in justifying his exclusion from this
designated public forum. 146 Forbes reasoned that
he was a legally qualified candidate and thus,
AETC's subjective determination that he was
"non-newsworthy" was not narrowly drawn to
140 The Arkansas Educational Television Commission
controls the programming broadcast on the Arkansas Educa-
tional Television Network. The Commission and its staff are
state employees. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 6-3-102(a) (1)-(b) (1)
(Michie 1996); see also discussion supra note 21.
141 See Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n, 118 S. Ct. at
1637.
142 See id. at 1637-38.
141" Forbes asserted that the spirit of political discourse is
shielded by the First Amendment. See Brief for Respondent
at 12, Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 118 S.
Ct. 1633 (1998) (No. 96-779) (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 14 (1976)). Forbes argued that the letter of law pro-
motes uninhibited political broadcast, "in order to assure
[the] unfettered interchange of ideas." See id.
144 See Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 118 S.
Ct. 1633, 1639 (1998). See also discussion supra note 39.
145 See Brief for Respondent at 15, Arkansas Educ. Televi-
sion Comm'n v. Forbes, 118 S. Ct. 1633 (1998) (No. 96-779).
Forbes contended that AETC intended to open its station to
public debate, thus creating a public forum. See id.
146 See id. at 23. Forbes refuted AETN's position that the
station would serve the public interest by limiting the debate
to viable candidates. See id. at 28-29. Cf Brief for Petitioner
at 30 (citing Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l
Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 121 (1973)) (arguing AETC's editorial
judgment would be undermined if the public enjoyed unlim-
ited access to its network).
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meet the compelling interest standard. 147 Fur-
thermore, Forbes contended that AETC's subjec-
tive determination was viewpoint based.148 Forbes
noted that the Court has consistently held ,that
viewpoint discrimination runs contrary to the First
Amendment.1 4 9
AETC denied that Forbes exclusion was view-
point based, rather, AETC asserted that it made
an educated decision to dedicate its station to
political debate between "newsworthy candi-
dates."150 AETC argued to the Court that a jour-
nalist's editorial judgment enjoys First Amend-
ment protection. 151 Thus, AETC concluded that
its decision to exclude Forbes was reasonable in
light its purpose, to educate the public about the
viable contenders in the upcoming election.' 52
Further, AETC stated that Forbes' First Amend-
ment claim to access was unavailing because
AETC designated its debate a nonpublic forum,
where only invited candidates could partici-
pate. 153 The network argued that it had a com-
pelling interest in serving the public and its staff
concluded that only "newsworthy" candidates fur-
thered its objective. 1 5 4 AETC found that Forbes
was non-newsworthy and it reasonably denied
Forbes' request for access.1 5
5
147 See Brief for Respondent at 28, Arkansas Educ. Televi-
sion Comm'n v. Forbes, 118 S. Ct. 1633 (1998) (No. 96-779).
Further, Forbes noted AETC's 'ad hoc' justification for his
exclusion-AETC reserved its forum for 'newsworthy
candidiates'-differed from AETC's justification on the rec-
ord. See id. at 18 n.7.
148 See id. at 28-29.
149 See id. at 29 (citing Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors
of Univ. of Va,, 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995)) (stating that view-
point discrimination is prohibited on all government prop-
erty).
150 See Brief for Petitioner at 31, Arkansas Educ. Televi-
sion Comm'n v. Forbes, 118 S. Ct. 1633 (1998) (No. 96-779).
These newsworthy candidates happened to be major party
candidates who AETC believed held the most public support.
See Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 118 S. Ct.
1633, 1637, 1643 (1998). Forbes asserted that the record
supports his contention that AETC engaged in viewpoint dis-
crimination because AETC has not demanded that major
party candidates "prove their viability" even where major
party candidates have less financial support than their in-
dependent running mates. See Brief for Petitioner at 36, Ar-
kansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 118 S. Ct. 1633
(1998) (No. 96-779) (citingJoint Appendix at 133-34, 136-38,
175).
151 See Brief for Petitioner at 30 (citing Columbia Broad.
Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 121 (1973)).
152 AETC asserted that their only object was to serve the
public. See id. The record provides that AETC's Executive Di-
rector Susan Howarth testified that "the debates were
designed to benefit the viewers of AETN in the Third Con-
gressional District, that we were putting the debate on for
B. Public Broadcast of Political Speech is a
Nonpublic Forum
The Supreme Court determined that AETC
could exclude Forbes provided his exclusion was
"viewpoint neutral" and "reasonable in light of
the purpose of the property."' 56 The majority rec-
ognized the First Amendment values inherent in
political discourse and thus, subjected public
broadcasters' 'journalistic discretion" to review
under the Court's Public Forum Doctrine. 57 Fo-
rum analysis is normally precluded under tradi-
tional review of programming decisions. 1 58 How-
ever, Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority,
rationalized that political debates are distin-
guished from other types of programming for two
reasons.1 59 First, historically, political debate was
a forum where candidates expressed themselves
without the media's outside interference.160 Sec-
ond, debates have been an integral part of the
electoral process. 61 Nonetheless, Justice Ken-
nedy concluded that public broadcast dedicated
to political speech was a nonpublic forum when
the "microphone" was not "open" to the general
public. 1 62 The majority found that the record
supported AETC's contention that its decision to
their benefit." Brief for Petitioner at 32.
153 See id. at 32-33, 36.
154 AETC's staff considered the following in their consid-
eration of Forbes' request: (1) the public's lack of interest in
Forbes' campaign; (2) Forbes' lack of media coverage; (3)
lack of organized campaign support staff; (4) Forbes' weak
showing in other campaigns; (5) Forbes' lack of financial
support and; (6) lack of public engagements. See id. at 32-
33.
155 See id. at 33-34.
156 Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 118 S.
Ct. 1633, 1643 (1998) (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal De-
fense and Educ. Fund Inc, 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985))
157 See id.
158 See supra note 21 (distinguishing public broadcasters
from broadcasters generally). See generally Hightower, supra
note 92, at 175-76 (discussing the Court's treatment of public
broadcasting).
159 SeeArkansas Educ. Television Comm'n, 118 S.Ct at 1640.
160 See id; see also id. at 1647 (reasoning that debates are
"by design a forum for political speech by the candidates")..
161 See id. at 1640 (citing CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367,
396 (1981)). In CBS, Justice Burger found that section
312(a)(7) contributes to the First Amendment interests of
candidates, voters and broadcasters because it affords candi-
dates the opportunity to inform the public about their plat-
form and it affords the electorate an opportunity to reevalu-
ate their choices. Id. at 396 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1, 52-53 (1976)).
162 Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n, 118 S.Ct at 1642
(reasoning AETC created a nonpublic forum when it limited
its debate to only viable candidates).
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limit the debate to viable candidates was both rea-
sonable and viewpoint neutral. 163
C. Justice Stevens: The Prior Restraint on
Candidates' Free Speech
Justice Stevens, writing for the dissent, focused
his inquiry on the public nature of the debate by
comparing the debate to a prior restraint on free
expression. 164 Justice Stevens compared the gov-
ernment-sponsored debate to a parade where a
government official issues a public license for the
use of the city streets. 165 Justice Stevens reasoned
that precedent supported the dissent's position
because the Court has analogized the power to is-
sue permits with the "censorial" power to place a
prior restraint on free expression. 166 The dissent
argued that AETC's decision to exclude Forbes
should be governed by "pre-established objective
criteria.' 1 67 The dissent maintained that contrary
to precedent, Justice Kennedy failed to narrowly
define the limits of a "viewpoint neutral exercise
of journalistic discretion."' 6  The dissent recog-
nized the majority opinion's emphasis on the sig-
nificance of political speech in our democratic
163 See id. at 1643-44 (1998). Justice Kennedy did not
question the "good faith" of AETC's staff because its "good
faith" was a question of fact decided by the jury below. Id.
164 See id. at 1644, 1649-50 (StevensJ., dissenting, joined
by Souter,J., and Ginsburg,J.). The dissent did not object to
the majority's classification of the debate as a nonpublic fo-
rum. See id. at 1644.
165 See id. at 1647-48.
166 See id. (citing Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S.
147, 150-51 (1969) (invalidating a city ordinance that "sub-
ject[ed] the exercise of First Amendment freedoms to the
prior restraint of a license, without narrow, objective, and
definite standards to guide the licensing authority").
167 See id. at 1645 (comparing the guidelines imposed on
private broadcasting stations by the Federal Election Cam-
paign Act). See also 11 C.F.R. § 110.13(c) (1998). The criteria
for candidate selection declared that "[flor general election
debates, staging organization(s) shall not use nomination by
a particular political party as the sole objective criterion to
determine whether to include a candidate in a debate." See
id. The section goes to explain when organizations may re-
strict participation. See id.
168 See Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 118
S. Ct. 1633, 1649-50 (1998).
169 See id. at 1648 (quoting Forsyth County v. Nationalist
Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 133 (1992). Justice Stevens noted
that Forsyth opinion recognized that government officials
must be held accountable for their decisions when they place
a prior restraint on free expression; "[t] he First Amendment
prohibits the vesting of such unbridled discretion in a gov-
ernment official." See id.
170 Id. at 1649. Moreover, Justice Stevens found evidence
in the record that Forbes' exclusion very well "may have de-
system of government, however, the dissent con-
tended that the opinion discounted the impact of
a public broadcaster's decision to exclude legally
qualified candidates for federal office. 169 Justice
Stevens argued that AETC arbitrarily evaluated
Forbes' viability. 170 Moreover, Justice Stevens
maintained that confining broadcasters' to objec-
tive criteria would not hamper their ability to ex-
clude candidates who did not warrant coverage.' 7 '
Thus, the dissent was persuaded that a state offi-
cial's control over access to government spon-
sored debate should be treated as a prior restraint
on free expression. 72
II1. CLARIFICATION OF OUR FIRST
AMENDMENT VALUES
A. Debating Programming and the "Ad Hoc"
Selection Process
In light of the majority's approval of AETC's
candidate selection process, political speech will
be curtailed if public broadcasters are free to
"pick and choose" candidates that they believe are
viable candidates for federal office. 173 Justice
termined the outcome of the election." See id. at 1645 (not-
ing the Republican winner's slim margin in the 1992 Con-
gressional race).
171 See id. at 1649 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (returning to
the theory of spectrum scarcity by asserting "when the de-
mand for speaking facilities exceeds supply, the State must
'ration or allocate the scarce resources on some acceptable
neutral principle'") (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector and Visi-
tors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 835 (1995)).
172 See id. 1649-50.
173 See, e.g., Chicago Acorn v. Metro. Pier and Exposition
Auth., 150 F.3d 695, 699 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding that state
officials in controlling a naval pier designated for recreation
and commercial use are not able to "pick and choose" among
political advocacy groups that are allowed to used the facil-
ity). The Seventh Circuit based its holding on the reasoning
set forth in Arkansas Educational Television Commission. See id.
at 701. The court reasoned that Arkansas Educational Televi-
sion Commission established that the state must adopt criteria
if its going to restrict access to a nonpublic forum dedicated
to political speech. See id. at 701-02. Although the Seventh
Circuit recognized the need for objectivity, the court denied
it any meaning when it reasoned that objectivity is left to "the
good-faith exercise" of state officials. See id. at 701. The Sev-
enth Circuit stated that political or ideological consequences
are unavoidable when the state dedicates a nonpublic forum
to political speech, however, the Seventh Circuit refused to
condemn itsjudgment. See id. at 701, 704. But see, William C.
Canaby, Jr., The First Amendment and the State as Editor: Implica-
tions for Public Broadcasting, 52 TEX. L. REv. 1121, 1127 (1974)
(finding that "[t]he ultimate danger is not that the govern-
ment's point of view gets across; it is that the views of others
do not").
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Kennedy categorically classified government-spon-
sored debates based on AETC's candidate-by-can-
didate selection process.17 4 Justice Kennedy be-
lieved that this process was consistent with
Cornelius' distinction between government prop-
erty intended for "general access" and govern-
ment property intended for "selective access. 1 75
However, the restrictions in both Cornelius and
Perry were permissible because: (1) the govern-
ment dedicated its property to a specific pur-
pose;176 and (2) the regulation was reasonable
and not an effort to suppress to the speakers'
message. 177 In Cornelius, the majority was com-
fortable in allowing restrictions on speech activity
because the speakers had alternative modes of
communication. 17 Justice O'Connor, writing for
the majority, reasoned that "[r]arely will a non-
public forum provide the only means of contact
with a particular audience.' 79 Thus, Forbes was
in a "rare" position because network access was
not only Forbes most "efficient way" to communi-
cate, rather, it was the only way for the public to
evaluate Forbes' arguments against his opponents
in AETC's live debate.' 8 0
174 See Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 118
S.Ct 1633, 1642-43 (1998).
175 See id. at 1642.
176 In Perry, the School Board dedicated its internal mail
system to serve its teachers. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry
Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 40-41 (1983). It invited
PEA to use its system because it acted as the exclusive union
represented of all the districts' teacher. See id. at 51-52. In
Cornelius, the government dedicated its charity drive to solici-
tation by "voluntary, charitable, health and welfare agencies"
whose services directly benefit the employees. See Cornelius
v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund Inc, 473 U.S. 788,
795 (1985).
177 See Cornelius, 460 U.S. at 811.
178 See id. at 809.
179 See id. (contending that in a nonpublic forum, "[t]he
First Amendment does not demand unrestricted access" be-
cause it may be "the most efficient way of delivering the
speaker's message").
180 AETC only sponsored one debate for the Arkansas'
Third Congressional seat, from which it excluded Forbes. See
Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n, 118 S.Ct 1633, 1637 (1998).
181 See Political Programming Policies, supra note 130;
see also The Bipartisan Integrity Campaign Act of 1997, H.R.
2183, 105t' Cong. (1998). The Act's objective is to amend
the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, in order to re-
form campaign finance. 144 CONG. REc. 7298 (1998).
182 See, e.g., Editorial, Open Debates for All Candidates,
WASH. POST, SEPT. 16, 1996, at A18 (advocating to open de-
bate and allow free television spots for all parties who qualify
for the ballot). See also 144 CONG. REc. 7298, 7303 (1998)
(statement of Rep. Johnson) (stating that in light of the ad-
vertising, debates provide candidates an alternative mode of
communication with the electorate); see also 144 CONG. REc.
Generally, poorly-funded candidates, like
Forbes, enjoy only limited media coverage. For
example, purchasing airtime has been so costly
that both Congress and the FCC have repeatedly
responded with reform to our current system."
The public has expressed concern that candidates
are at the mercy of the media.18 2 Critics com-
ment on the difficulties poorly-funded candidates'
have in gaining media exposure.' 8 3 Thus, non-
commercial stations may provide the only practi-
cal forum where these candidates can effectively
reach his or her audience.18 4
The Federal Communications Commission also
contends that broadcasters are in a position to
"revitalize our democracy" when networks dedi-
cate complimentary airtime to candidate de-
bate. 8 5 Nonetheless, the majority discounted the
value of Forbes' participation in a publicly-spon-
sored debate. 8 6 Although Forbes failed to file a
complaint with the Commission before proceed-
ing to the district court, 87 Forbes' statutory right
to reasonable access is "grounded in the First
Amendment." 188 Congress recognized that the
media is central to the electorate's candidate se-
7298, 7311 (1998) (statement of Rep. Farr) (emphasizing the
cost of advertising limits common folk from running for of-
fice).
1833 See Hundt, supra note 8, at 1100 (arguing that the
cost of "television advertising and fundraising is an enormous
barrier for candidates seeking public office").
184 Some commentators suggest that the Internet is an
affordable alternative to reach a large audience, however it is
hardly a forum for political debate. See MARK SABLEMAN,
MORE SPEECH , NOT LESS, COMMUNICATIONS LAW IN THE INFOR-
MATION AGE 246 (1997); see also Kern, supra note 10, at 9
(discussing the Internet as an alternative medium for polit-
ical discourse).
185 See, e.g., Speech by Reed E. Hunt Chairman, Federal
Communications Coin mission, Variety/Schroder Wertheim
Media Conference (New York, NY, April 1, 1997), (visited
October 29, 1998) <http://www.fcc.gov> (emphasizing that
broadcasters must remain aware of their public interest re-
quirements by reserving airtime for "direct access by candi-
dates to voters").
186 See Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 118
S. Ct. 1633, 1642 (1998) (reasoning that opening debate to
all legally qualified candidates would not further First
Amendment interests in free speech). But cf CBS, Inc. v.
FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 396 (1981) (reasoning that "[t]he First
Amendment 'has its fullest and most urgent application pre-
cisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office'")
(quoting Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272
(1971)).
187 See discussion supra note 28 and accompanying text.
188 See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364,
379 (1984); see also Columbia Broad. Sys. Inc. v. Democratic
Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 117 (1973) (finding that Congress
has "First Amendment values written into the Radio Act and
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lection and thus, all legally qualified candidates
have a statutory right of "reasonable access" under
Section 312(a) (7) of the Communications Act of
1934.189 In CBS Inc., the Court approved the
Commission's interpretation of Section 312 (a) (7)
by describing it as a balance of "the First Amend-
ment rights of federal candidates, the public and
the broadcasters."' 90 Thus, Forbes' failure to ex-
haust his administrative remedies should not
thwart his First Amendment right to air his polit-
ical views. Furthermore, broadcasters' enjoy the
protection of the First Amendment even when
programmers must adhere to Section 312(a)(7),
which fosters candidates' political speech. 19 1
B. Finding Room for Independent Candidates:
Defining Viewpoint Neutral Criteria
In light of independent candidates' limited me-
dia coverage, the Court must ensure the govern-
ment's exclusion of a qualified candidate is not
ambiguous. The exclusion must be both "reason-
able" and "viewpoint neutral."' 92 The FCC has es-
tablished statutory guidelines under Section
its successor, the Communications Act [of 1934]).
189 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)( 7) (1994).
190 See CBS, Inc. V. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 397 (1981).
191 See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
192 See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n,
460 U.S. 37, 46-47 (1983); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal De-
fense and Educ. Fund Inc, 473 U.S. 788, 811 (1985).
193 47 U.S.C. 312(a)(7). Cf Federal Election Campaign
Act of 1971, § 316, as amended, 2 U.S.C. § 441 (b); 11 C.F.R.
§§ 110.13, 114.4(f) (1998). The Federal Election Commis-
sion permits eligible nonprofit organizations to stage debates
on the condition they extend their invitation based on "pre-
established objective criteria." 11 C.F.R. § 110.13 (c).
194 47 U.S.C. § 390 (1994) (providing support to "public
telecommunications facilities" in return for enhanced pro-
gramming).
195 See Hightower supra note 92, at 135-36 (discussing
Congress' intent that public networks serve as "an alternative
fare" to commercial networks). See also 47 U.S.C. § 390(3).
Congress enacted section 390 to "strengthen the capability of
existing public television and radio stations to provide public
telecommunications services to the public." See id. Cf EDITO-
RIAL INTEGRITY IN PUBLIC BROADCASTING: PROCEEDINGS OF THE
WINDSPRING CONFERENCE (1994) (setting forth a creed for
the public broadcasting industry to further the public's inter-
est in diversity).
196 See, e.g., Jeff Meyers, Forums to Bring Candidates to Vot-
ers, WISCONSIN STATE JOURNAL, Sept. 27, 1998, at 6E (discuss-
ing "Friday Night Forums" where the people of Wisconsin
gather to submit questions for gubernatorial and Senate
races, asked and answered during a public broadcast).
197 SeeArkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 118
S. Ct. 1633, 1643 (1998).
198 AETC's Executive Director and staff excluded Forbes
312(a) (7) that provide broadcasters with some di-
rection in executing these decisions. 193 However,
public broadcasters have a special obligation to
meet the obligations under Section 390.194 Public
broadcasting networks were created to promote
the program diversity that may be inhibited in
commercial programming where the market fixes
the networks' agendas. 195 Today, public networks
regularly sponsor candidate debates that reflect
the public's concerns without commercial influ-
ence. 196 Thus, all qualified candidates must be in-
vited indiscriminately.
In Arkansas Educational Television Commission,
the majority denied that the record supported a
finding that AETC's decision was viewpoint
based. 1 97 Notably, nothing in the record' 98 sup-
ported a finding that the station used some "crite-
ria" when making its selection. 199 The majority
condoned Forbes' exclusion when his exclusion
afforded major party contenders more airtime to
advocate their positions on the station's limited
frequencies.200 However, the scarcity rationale
does not undermine candidates' First Amend-
ment right of access to broadcasting networks z.2 0
because they felt he had little public support, when in fact he
had considerable support when he ran for office in 1992. See
id. at 1645; see also supra note 39 and accompanying text.
199 See Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n, 118 S. Ct. at
1637. AETC staff made programming decisions based on a
"Statement of Principles of Editorial Integrity in Public
Broadcasting." See THE ARKANSAS EDUCATIONAL TELEVISION
COMMISSION PROGRAMMING POLICY FOR AETN 2 (adopted
June 7, 1994). This statement provides that the station will
maintain the "public trust in its editorial integrity by shield-
ing the programming process from improper political pres-
sure or influence from program funders or other sources."
See id. AETN follows the guidelines set forth in EDITORIAL
INTEGRITY IN PUBLIC BROADCASTING: PROCEEDINGS OF THE
WINDSPRNG CONFERENCE (1994). However, as Justice Stevens
noted, Simmons, a local journalist worked extensively with
AETC staff on its debate. See Arkansas Educ. Television
Comm'n, 118 S. Ct at 1645 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also
Brief for Petitioner at 9-10 (stating that Simmons judgment
was respected because of his "credibility" and experience").
Nonetheless, AETC decided to invite the major party con-
tenders before Forbes even qualified for the ballot. See Ar-
kansas Educ. Television Comm'n, 118 S. Ct at 1645 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). This suggests that Forbes may not have been se-
riously evaluated based on "viewpoint neutral" criteria if
AETC had already extended its initial invitations. If a more
defined selection process were in place, AETC could show
Forbes' claim was without merit. Cf Forsyth County v. Nation-
alist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 133 (1992) (stating that absent a
basis for an official's decision, the Court cannot review its
credibility).
200 See Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 118
S. Ct. 1633, 1643 (1998).
201 See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S.367 (1969);
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Furthermore, the Court has explicitly stated that
the First Amendment prohibits government enti-
ties from engaging in viewpoint discrimination on
the basis of scarcity, absent some "acceptable neu-
tral principle. '202 Thus, it is imperative that pub-
lic broadcasters fulfill their First Amendment obli-
gations and evaluate candidates in a neutral
manner.
Justice Kennedy was reluctant to impose re-
straints on broadcasters' 'journalistic discretion"
because he felt this would inhibit debate rather
than enlarge the "marketplace of ideas."203 To
support his contention, Justice Kennedy referred
to one instance where a debate was canceled be-
cause broadcasters were hesitant to exclude a can-
didate in light of the decision below. 20 4 However,
without objective guidelines to follow, broadcast-
ers will exercise unfettered discretion in selecting
candidates who they believe are qualified to par-
ticipate. 20 5
Given the value placed on political expression,
Justice Stevens' suggestion that that government-
sponsored debate should be treated as a prior re-
straint on speech activity emerges as the sound
position.206 The Court has prohibited govern-
ment officials from ambiguously excluding groups
from speech activity.20 7 The Court imposed ob-
jective criteria on government officials, which
safeguarded our First Amendment value in free
see also discussion of Red Lion supra note 94 and accompany-
ing text.
202 See Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va,
515 U.S. 819, 835 (1995) (prohibiting the government's arbi-
trary viewpoint discrimination).
203 Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 118 S.
Ct. 1633, 1643 (1998).
204 See id; see also OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Aug. 24, 1996
(reporting the debate's cancellation).
205 See Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n, 118 S. Ct. at
1645 (Stevens, J. dissenting) (reasoning "[t]he apparent flex-
ibility of AETC's purported standard suggests the extent to
which the staff had nearly limitless discretion to exclude
Forbes from the debate based on ad hoc justifications"). See
also Dienes, On Speech Issues, supra note 22 (commenting that
public broadcasters cannot engage in "covert censorship").
FurtherJustice Stevens noted Justice Kennedy's concern was
unwarranted because public networks could easily avoid any
First Amendment challenges to their 'journalistic discretion'
if networks simply delineated some neutral criteria before in-
viting legally qualified candidates to participate. See Arkansas
Educ. Television Comm'n, 118 S. Ct. at 1649 n. 19.
206 See id. at 1648.
207 See Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150
(1969) (invalidating an ordinance which allowed city officials
to exclude the public from public streets based on their
"ideas of public welfare .. .good order, morals or conven-
ience. ")
expression. 20  Thus, broadcasters would adopt
objective criteria rather than basing a decision to
exclude candidates on a moral pretext or overly-
broad "Statement of Principles. '" 2 0 9 Furthermore,
lower courts will have difficulty evaluating a candi-
date's claim under the First Amendment if the
term "viewpoint neutral" remains undefined.2 10
Minimal guidelines would not run afoul of the
Constitution, rather they would provide a practi-
cal framework for lower courts.211
IV. CONCLUSION
Broadcasters are aware that their freedoms
under the First Amendment are subject to serving
the public interest. It is in the public interest to
receive a balanced presentation of the views. The
public will be denied this interest if independent
candidates are arbitrarily excluded from candi-
date debate. Independent candidates who re-
quest access to a government-sponsored debate
have a valid claim under the First Amendment.
However, lower courts will have a difficult time
evaluating their claim under the Supreme Court's
viewpoint neutral standard when this standard is
left to public broadcasters to define. Thus, in-
dependent candidates maybe forced to advocate
their positions in the traditional town-square,
while the public remains at home watching or lis-
tening to debates broadcast via electronic media.
208 See id. at 150-51.
209 See discussion supra note 199. Cf Shuttlesworth, 394
U.S. at 150 (finding that government officials' unrestrained
discretion may lead to government censorship).
210 See Marcus v. Iowa Pub. Television, 24 MEDIA L. REP.
2531 (1996) (upholding a broadcasters'judgment to exclude
an independent candidate running for federal office when
the broadcaster stated he was not "newsworthy" ). Iowa Pub-
lic Television followed the same "Statement of Principles of
Editorial Integrity in Public Broadcasting" as AETC. See id. at
2533. In Marcus, the court distinguished this candidate's ex-
clusion from Forbes' case because the Iowa network did not
question this candidates' viability. See id. at 2533. However,
in either case the networks excluded a legally qualified candi-
date from public debate, without any neutral principle justify-
ing its decision, other than this "broadcaster's creed." See id.
Cf EDITORIAL INTEGRITY IN PUBLIC BROADCASTING: PROCEED-
INGS OF T1HE WINDSPRING CONFERENCE (1994) (outlining the
public broadcaster's obligation to the public).
211 Minimal guidelines preserve journalistic discretion
and yet, account for the public interest in receiving a "bal-
anced presentation of the views." See FCC v. League of Wo-
men Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 376 (citing Columbia Broad. Sys. v.
Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 124 (1973)). Cf CBS,
Inc., v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367 (1981) (upholding FCC guidelines
under § 312(a) (7)). See Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v.
Forbes, 118 S. Ct. 1633, 1649 (1998) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(emphasing the small burden on public networks).
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